Price leadership by Rotemberg, Julio & Saloner, Garth


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
http://www.archive.org/details/priceleadership00rote3

working paper
department
of economics
Number 412
-PEICE LEADERSHIP
By
Julio J. .Rotemberg*
and Garth Saloner
September 1985
Revised February 1986
mossachusetts
institute of
technology
50 memorial drive
Cambridge, mass. 02139

-PRICE LEADERSHIP
By
Julio J. Rotemberg*
and Garth Saloner
Number 412 September 1985
Revised February 1986
*Sloan School of Management and Department of Economics, M.I.T. respectively.
We would like to thank the participants of the GTE Labs. Economics symposium
(August 1985) for useful comments and the National Science Foundation (grants
SES-8209266 and IST-8510162 respectively) for financial support.
..:••-.- ,....
''DEC 3 MS
I. INTRODUCTION
In many industries a price change is announced by one of the firms in
advance of the date at which the new price will take effect and the new price
is swiftly matched by the other firms in the industry. This form of price
leadership is the focus of this paper. It has two striking features: price
changes are usually matched to the penny even though the products produced by
the firms are often somewhat differentiated, and a long time elapses between
price changes (often a year or more).
Examples of this pattern of pricing behavior abound. Perhaps the best-
known example is that of the cigarette industry in the late 1920's and early
1930's. For example on October 4, 1929 Reynolds announced an increase in its
price from $6.00 to $6.40 per thousand (effective the October 5) and was
followed the next day by both of its major competitors, Liggett and Meyers
and American Tobacco. That price was in effect for almost two years before
Reynolds led a further increase (to $6.85) • Similar pricing behavior has
been documented in the steel, dynamite, anthracite and airline industries.
The Industrial Organization literature distiguishes between three forms
of price leadership. The first, collusive price leadership, was described by
Markham in 1951 as "price leadership in lieu of overt collusion". However,
the method by which price leadership could achieve the coordination necessary
to sustain monopolistic outcomes has not been spelled out.
The second, "barometric" price leadership, refers to a situation in
which the price leader merely announces the price that would prevail anyway
See Nicholls (1951) for a detailed discussion of pricing in the cigarette
industry during this period.
See Stigler (1947) for a discussion and further references.
under competition. In contrast to the collusive price leader, the
barometric price leader has no power to (substantially) affect the price
that is charged generally in the industry. Indeed the actual price being
charged may soon diverge from that announced by the barometric firm, which
in turn is unable to exert any disciplining influence to prevent this from
occuring.
The third form of price leadership, and the one which has been the
focus of most formal modelling, is the one that results from the existence of
a dominant firm. Models of this type (see Gaskins (1971), Judd and Petersen
(1985)) assume that the dominant firm sets the price of a homogeneous
product. This price is then taken as given by a competitive fringe of firms.
Unfortunately, this model cannot explain the behavior of oligopolies in which
there are several large firms. Such large firms cannot be assumed to take as
given the price set by any one firm. Rather, they should be expected to act
strategically.
The goal of this paper is to develop a model of collusive price
leadership. We study markets in which duopolists attempt to achieve
monopolistic outcomes by exploiting the fact that they have repeated
encounters over time. In particular, they attempt to collude by threatening
to revert to noncooperative behavior if any firm deviates from implicitly
agreed upon behavior. The key feature of the markets that we model is that
^The identical criticism can be applied to the model of d'Aspremont et al
(1983). There, a group of equal-sized firms collude to set the price; the
remaining firms, which are assumed to be of the same size, treat this price
parametrically. Since this explicitly assumes that the fringe firms are
large, the above criticism is especially relevant.
T'his model is thus in the spirit of the supergame model of Friedman
(1971).
the firms may be asymmetrically informed about industry demand conditions.
In an ideal world (from the duopolists' point of view) the firms would meet
to aggregate their information and then fix prices which would hold until
their next meeting. In practice, however, such behavior would run foul of
the antitrust laws. Moreover if the firms are not unanimous about the prices
that should be charged, they may have an incentive to mis report their private
information to each other.
What then ought an asymmetrically informed duopoly do to ensure
outcomes better than the noncooperative ones? It could allow the better
informed firm to announce its price first and let the second firm pick a
price as a function of the first firm's announcement. To prevent the second
firm from simply undercutting the first firm, the precise function must be
understood by both firms, and the second firm must be punished (by a period
of noncooperation) if it deviates from this function. Typically, where the
products are differentiated, an optimal function of this type would lead to
different prices across firms. In practice, the function that gives the
second firm's price as a function of the first would probably have to be
quite complicated for the duopoly to do as well as it can. Recall that the
second firm must make an inference about the state of demand and costs from
the first firm's price. But a high price by the first firm can mean that
demand for both firms is high, that relative demand has shifted in favor of
the first firm, or that the first firm has had an idiosyncratic increase in
costs. Thus the optimal pricing function will have to take into account the
probabilities of these various events. For punishments not to be triggered
by accident, both firms must understand the exact form of this function.
Furthermore, changes in the environment such as the development of new
products, the advent of new competition and technology, and modifications to
the nature of government interventions, require changes in this function over
time. Again, the way in which the function changes must be understood by
both firms without explicit communication. This is further complicated by
the fact that, typically, firms do not have similar perceptions about
environmental changes; nor do they fully understand each other's
perceptions.
As Grossman and Hart (1984) have pointed out, even in a world in which
enforceable explicit contracts are feasible, one cannot expect firms to take
into account, as would be necessary for full optimality, the myriad
contingencies that can arise. One reason for this is the bounded rationality
of the participants and another is that more complicated contracts are more
costly to develop than simple ones.
In such circumstances, and especially when one of the firms has
superior information to the other, price leadership emerges as a natural
collusive scheme. The scheme is simplicity itself: pricing decisions are
delegated to the better informed firm (the "leader") who announces pricing
decisions ahead of time. For its part, the follower is expected to match
these prices exactly. This scheme has a number of positive attributes from
the point of view of the duopoly: it is extremely easy to implement;
defining adherence to the scheme is trivial in the sense that there is no
ambiguity as to the desired response of the follower; no overt collusion
(either through information transfer or price-fixing) is required and,
while the scheme is generally not optimal, both firms enjoy responsiveness
to demand conditions since prices embody the leader's superior information.
It seems natural that the better informed firm would be the price
leader since aggregate profits are higher in this case. However, if the
firms produce differentiated products and a common price is charged, they
will typically have differing preferences about what that price should be.
Since the firm that is the designated price leader typically earns higher
profits under these circumstances, it might be expected that both firms
would vie for the leadership position. We show, however, that when one of
the firms is much better informed than the other, the latter may prefer to
follow than to lead. Thus the industry leader may emerge endogenously.
There may be circumstances, however, when the disparity in profits
between the leader and the follower is great. We show that this disparity
in profits can be reduced (and a more "equitable" distribution of profits
achieved) if the price leader keeps its price constant for some time. In
this case, the leader faces a tradeoff. On the one hand, it would like to
exploit the follower by responding strongly to current relative demand. On
the other hand, if relative demand conditions are expected to revert to
normalcy in a little while, such a strong response reduces future profits.
Therefore, rigid prices reduce the response of the leader's price to
current relative demand. Generally, however, the follower will not be in
favor of completely rigid prices. Counterbalancing the profit-sharing
benefit of inflexible prices is the advantage of letting the leader respond
to common (and not merely relative) demand fluctuations. Somewhat (but not
completely) rigid prices should therefore be expected to be a feature of a
price leadership regime.
While the duopolists are able to achieve a somewhat collusive outcome
using price leadership, they clearly do not do as well as they would if they
were completely unconstrained i.e. if they could sign a binding contract and
could enforce honest revelation of private information. Consumers, on the
other hand, are generally better off under a price leadership regime than
they are when faced with overt collusion. When demand is relatively strong
for the leader's product, the leader sets a high price, and thus consumer
surplus from each product is low compared with that under full collusion.
The opposite is true when demand for the leader's product is relatively weak.
However, the increase in consumer surplus when demand for the leader's
product is relatively weak exceeds the reduction in consumer surplus when it
is relatively strong. This is because consumer surplus is a convex function
of price.
Evaluating welfare as the simple sum of consumer and producer surplus
yields the result that overall welfare is even lower under price leadership
than under overt collusion! This suggests that price leadership, where it
occurs, warrants the scrutiny of the antitrust authorities. The U.S. Courts,
however, take a very accomodating attitude towards price leadership. As
early as 1927 in U.S. v. International Harvester , the U.S. Supreme Court
stated:
"[international Harvester] has not .. attempted to dominate or in fact
controlled or dominated the harvesting machinery industry by the
compulsory regulation of prices. The most that can be said as to this,
is that many of its competitors have been accustomed, independently and
as a matter of business expediency, to follow approximately the prices
at which it has sold its harvesting machines ... .And the fact that
competitors may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgement, to
follow the prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any
suppression of competition or show any sinister domination.'
The reluctance of the courts to find price leaders guilty of price
fixing stems in part from the possibility that a perfectly innocent firm
5U.S. v. International Harvester Co. , 274 U.S. 693, 708-709 (1927). See also
Scherer (1980) p. 520 ff.
could find itself in violation of the antitrust laws simply because its
rivals follow it and in part because of the belief that it is generally-
difficult to distinguish collusive price leadership from its benign
barometric counterpart. We argue, however, that competitive pricing is
highly unlikely to lead to the pattern of pricing associated with price
leadership described above if the firms produce differentiated products. In
that case when there are sequential price announcements by the firms there
are two forces that tend to drive prices apart. First, the differentiation
itself tends to lead to different noncooperative prices, and, second, the
last firm to move usually has an incentive to undercut the price of its
predecessor. We examine these forces in a variety of noncooperative settings
including simultaneous and sequential move games. In the case of the
sequential move game we also study the noncooperative signalling model in
which the follower attempts to extract the leader's information from its
price. In brief, we find that in all of the settings we study at least one
of the above forces is present and it is only by the sheerest coincidence
that the firms' prices are identical in equilibrium.
Our theory has three empirically verifiable implications. First, an
industry that moves from price competition to a price leadership regime
should become more profitable. Second, the price leader should enjoy an even
greater increase in profitability than its rivals by virtue of its ability to
select the prices that will be charged. Finally, if the firms differ in the
quality of their information about demand conditions, a relatively well-
informed firm should emerge as the price leader.
An industry that attempts to make this change from competition to
price leadership therefore provides a convenient natural experiment through
which the validity of our theory can be assessed. One notable modern episode
8of this kind is the March 1983 attempt by American Airlines to lead the
industry to a new fare structure. After the deregulation of the domestic US
airline industry in the late 1970's and early 1980's, 6 the industry went
through a period of upheaval in which price war fare was common. Then,
without prior notice, on March 14, 1983 American Airlines announced a new
fare plan to become effective starting April 2. 8 The plan replaced thousands
of different fares with four basic mileage-based fares. American expressed
its desire for other airlines to match its fares and their response was quick
and positive. United adopted the plan the following day and by March 17 most
other airlines had adopted it too.
We present evidence that suggests that American's computer reservation
system (SABRE) provided it with detailed market demand information that was
unsurpassed in the industry. We also use stock market data to examine the
effect on the equity values of the airline companies of American's
announcement and the industry's response. Our results indicate that the
increase in those values was too unusual to be attributed to the random
fluctuations of the stock market. Furthermore, the airline that realized the
largest single gain in the value of its equity was none other than American
^The Airline Deregulation Act which was signed on October 28, 1978 proposed a
gradual relaxation of the Civil Aeronautics Board's regulation over a four
year period.
For an analysis of this period see Bailey, Graham and Kaplan (1985).
American to Base Fares on Mileage," New York Times, March 15, 1983-
^These fares were first class, coach, a 25% discount for off-peak travel and
a Super Saver fare. The Super Saver fare required advance purchase and had a
minimum required length of stay.
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"Most Big Airlines Back American's Fare Plan", New York Times, March 17,
1983-
Airlines, a finding that is consistent with the theory. Thus all three of
our theory's implications are broadly borne out by this historical episode.
The paper treats the subjects in the following order: the
noncooperative simultaneous move game with asymmetric information (Section
II), the price leadership model with the leader perfectly informed and the
follower completely uninformed (Section III), price rigidity (Section IV),
the noncooperative sequential move games (Section V), the welfare analysis
(Section VI), the price leadership model (incorporating a model of endogenous
choice of a price leader) with both firms imperfectly informed (Section
VII), and the analysis of the American Airlines fare plan (Section VIII).
Section IX provides concluding remarks and some suggested policy guidelines.
II THE SETTING, AND A NONCOOPERATIVE SOLUTION
We consider a duopoly in which firm 1 has better information about
demand conditions than firm 2. Both goods are produced with constant
marginal cost c The demands for goods are assumed to be given by:
Q
1
= x - bP
1
+ d(P
2
- P.,)
Q 2
= y - bP 2 + d(P 1 - p2 )
where Q. and P. are the quantities demanded and price of good i respectively.
The parameters x and y vary over time while b and d are positive constants.
The constant b gives the response of the quantity demanded of each good to a
fall in the price of both goods while d gives the response to a relative
increase in the other good's price. Note that d is zero if the demand for
both goods is independent while it is infinite if the goods are perfect
substitutes.
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It is convenient to decompose the demand disturbances into common and
idiosyncratic components. Letting a=(x+y)/2 and e=(x-y)'/2 the above
equations become:
Q
1
= a+e - bP
1
+d(P
2
-P
1
)
Q
1
= a-e - bP
2
+d(P
1
-P
2
). (1)
Note that in this form a and e are uncorrelated as long as the variance of x
and y are the same. The only lack of symmetry is given by e which raises
the demand for good 1 relative to that of good 2.
For simplicity, we initially assume that firm 1 knows both a and e
while firm 2 is totally uninformed. In particular firm 2 knows only the mean
of a (a) and the mean of e (zero). (in section V we relax this restriction
by letting both firms receive imperfect signals of a and e.) Moreover, we
assume that there is no credible way for firm 1 to communicate its
information. Note that firm 1 has an incentive to lie about its information-
If it could convince firm 2 that its demand is large, it could induce it to
charge a high price thus increasing demand for its own product.
In principle there are a variety of ways of modelling the outcome of
noncooperation between these two firms. We assume firms compete by
announcing prices. These announcements commit the firm to sell whatever is
demanded in the current period at that price. One can imagine both
simultaneous and sequential announcements. Neither firm however, wants to be
the first to announce a price since its competitor can then undercut it.
Thus we focus first on simultaneous announcements. In section IV we study
sequential announcements which might be thought to have some of the
Changes in e are akin in their effect to changes in the relative marginal
costs of the two firms.
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1 2
properties of price leadership. ''
We now study the equilibrium that emerges if both firms must annouce
their prices simultaneously. Since firm 2 has no state dependent information
it always announces the same price Pp« Thus firm 1 maximizes:
U
y
= (P
1
- c)(a + e - b?
1
+ d(P
2
- P^)
which leads to a price P. equal to (a+e+dPp+bc)/2(b+d) . Firm 2, on the other
hand, maximizes:
n
2
= E(P
2
- c)(a - e - bP
2
+ d(P
1
- P
2 ))
where E is the expectations operator and IL is the expected profit of firm 2.
Thus firm 2 charges:
P
2
= (a + be + dEP
1
)/2(b+d) = (a + (b+d)c)/(2b+d)
.
(2)
This implies that firm 1 charges:
P
1
= (a + (b+d)c)/(2b + d) + (a - a + e)/2(b+d). (3)
Thus, unless d=co so that the products are perfect substitutes, it is
only by coincidence that the prices charged by the two firms are the same.
For d finite this occurs only when (a-a) equals e.
For future reference we calculate IL in this equilibrium:
n
2
= [(£ + (b+d)c)/(2b + d) - c][a - b (a + (b+d)c)/(2b+d)
]
= b[(a - bc)/(2b + d)] 2 .
Note that in the first equality the first term in brackets represents the
difference between price and marginal cost while the second represents the
1 2Both of these equilibrium concepts are somewhat unsatisfactory because, in
both cases, at least one firm would like to change its price after it has
heard the other firm's price announcement. This is always true when prices
are announced sequentially. Here it is also true when they announce their
prices simultaneously because firm 2 learns some combination of a and e from
firm 1 ' s announcement
.
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average output of firm 2. For both of these magnitudes to be positive a must
exceed be, which, in turn, must be positive if coordinated price increases
are to reduce industry sales.
III. PRICE LEADERSHIP IN SUPERGAMES
In this section we show that price leadership can be a natural outcome
in oligopolies that try to sustain collusion by threatening to revert to
competition. These threats are credible because, even in the repeated game,
the noncooperative outcome studied in the previous section (or the sequential
move noncooperative equilibrium we study in section V) is an equilibrium. In
other words, the equilibria which embody these threats are subgame perfect.
We consider only punishments which consist of reversions to
noncooperative outcomes for some time. (in what follows, we assume, for
simplicity, that the reversion to noncooperation lasts forever). The actual
value of these punishments is computed below, where we also give a condition
which ensures that this punishment is sufficiently large that no
deviations take place in equilibrium.
We consider at first only two possible arrangements: either firm 1 or
firm 2 must announce its price first. Then the other firm sets its price.
Unless it is punished for doing so, the second firm will almost always desire
to undercut the price charged by the first firm. Thus, if collusion is to be
As Abreu (1982) has shown such punishments are not generally optimal.
Larger punishments can be achieved by punishing deviations from the
punishment strategy. Making this modification would have no material affect
on our results.
In this sense this paper differs from Rotemberg and Saloner (I984a,b) in
which these punishments were insufficient to generate collusion so that price
cutting (1984a) and inventories (1984b) were also employed.
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maintained, the follower must be penalized if it chooses a price lower than
the leader's.
Suppose that firm 1 is the leader and it can be sure that firm 2 will
follow its price P for the current period. Then firm 1 chooses P to
maximize:
R
1
= (P - c)(a + e - bP). (4)
Thus:
P = c/2 + (a + e)/2b, (5)
and firm 1 's profits are given by:
r = [ a + e - bc]
2/4b. (6)
Now consider firm 2. Should it follow firm 1? Firm 2 has two
incentives to deviate. First, when e is zero, it can increase its current
profits by undercutting firm 1. Second, when e is nonzero, it prefers both
P.. and P~ to differ from the price given by (5). Thus, to ensure that our
form of price leadership is an equilibrium we must ensure that the benefits
from continued cooperation outweigh the benefits from charging a price
different from P.
The expected profits from matching firm 1's price (R? ) are given by:
R
2
= E[(a+e)/2b-c/2][a-e - (a+e)/2 - bc/2]
= E[a - bc] 2/4b - 3Ee 2/4b, (7)
which is lower than B... If firm 2 fails to match firm 1 's price, it triggers
noncooperation from the following period on. This means that, if a and e are
i.i.d., it loses R?~^2 ^n ever3r period starting with the next one. If 6 is
the discount factor the discounted present value of these losses equals:
A' = {[E(a-a) 2 - 3Ee 2 ]/4b + (5 - bc) 2d 2/[4(2b+d) 2 b]}6/(l-6).
HAs we will see below, the first term in brackets actually represents
the advantage of letting firm 1 be the leader instead of firm 2. The second
term gives the excess of collusive over competitive profits when e is zero
and a equals a. A' is the difference in profits between being a follower in
our price leadership model and refusing to cooperate. It must be positive
for price leadership to be in both firms' interests.
Now we consider the profits made during the period in which firm 2
deviates. After observing P, firm 2 becomes somewhat informed about (a-a)
and e since it has an indirect observation of (a-a+e). Indeed, it knows that
[2bP- bc-a] = x is equal to (a-a+e). Let s be the variance of a while s is
a e
the variance of e. Then, firm 2's expectation of (a-a) is equal to
xs /(s +s ) while its expectation of e is xs /(s +s ) . If it were to charge
Pp after firm 1 irrevocably announced the price given by (5) its expected
profits would be:
(P. - e){l + [2bP-bc-i] (s -s )/(s + s )-bP +d(P - P )}. (8)
C. 3. 6 3. 6 d. c.
If it deviates, Firm 2 maximizes (8) which gives a price P :
P = {a + [2bP-bc-a](s -s )/(s +s ) + dP + (b+d)c }/2(b+d)
c. Sl S EL 6
= (2s a + [bs +(b+d)(s -s )]P + [ds +(2b+d)s ]c}/2(b+d)(s +s )L
e a a e
J a ' e J " a e
~2
and expected profits of bP„ .
On the other hand, by not deviating, firm 2 earns the expectation of
(8) evaluated at P. This is the expectation of (P-c ) (a-e-bP) conditional on
P, which equals:
(P-c) [is +b(s -3s )P-bc(s -s )]/(s +s ). (8)
e a e a e a e
So, for deviations not to take place, i.e. for price leadership to be
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an equilibrium, the following condition must be satisfied:
(P-c)[as + b(S - 3S )P-bc(S - S )]
Condition A : (b+d)(P
2
- c) - 1
—
r| - - A" < 0.
a e
The above equilibrium assumes that firm 2 would be punished for
downward and upwards deviations in its price. This, however, seems
unreasonable since firm 1 always prefers firm 2 to charge a higher price.
Suppose then, that a higher price by firm 2 would go unpunished. We now
derive a condition under which firm 2 would nonetheless never choose to raise
its price above that given by (5).
Taking the derivative of (8) with respect to Pp and evaluating at P,
one obtains:
A s [d-2(b+d)+2b(s -s )/(s +s )]P +(b+d)c -(a + bc)(s -s )/(s +s )
which implies:
A = {-[(4b+d)s +ds ]P - [l+cb](s -s )}/(s +s )+ (b+d)c.
e a a e a e
If A is positive firm 2 wants to raise its price above P. As P rises,
A falls since this makes undercutting more desirable. So we want to compute
this derivative for the smallest of all conceivable P's, namely P=c Then A
becomes
:
A = [-as - (2bc - a)s ]/(s +s ). (9)L
a eae
If the variance of e is zero this expression is always negative. It is
only when low prices signal low values of e that raising the price above P
would conceivably be in firm 2's interest. Also, for an increase in the
price to be worthwhile a must exceed 2bc so that monopoly profits are large.
Even then, the variance of e must exceed s /[1-2bc/a]. A necessary condition
for this to be true is that the variance of e exceed that of a. So, under
16
fairly weak conditions we can rule out the possibility that the follower
raises its price above the leader's. So, if Condition A is satisfied and (9)
is negative leadership by firm 1 is an equilibrium.
However that does not imply that this equilibrium is desired by firm 2.
If, however, the profits of firm 2 at this equilibrium exceed those it would
earn if it were the price leader itself, it is natural to expect firm 1 to be
the leader. If firm 2 is the price leader, it sets a price equal to
(a + bc)/2b which leads to expected profits given by:
L
2
- [a - bc] 2 /4b. (10)
Thus the difference between R„ and L„ is simply
[E(a-a) 2 - 3Ee 2 ]/4b. (11)
Firm 2 prefers to be a follower if the variance of a exceeds three
times the variance of e. A high variance of a makes firm 2 want to be a
follower since movements in a are incorporated into firm 1 's prices. On the
other hand variations in e are also incorporated in firm 1's prices, to firm
2's detriment. Thus, a high variance of e makes firm 2 prefer to be a
leader.
It might seem at this point that a price leadership scheme is a natural
way of organizing a duopoly with asymmetric information. Not only does the
leader have absolutely no incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy,
but the detection of cheating by the follower is extremely simple. Moreover,
in some circumstances the firms are unanimous in their choice of a leader.
However, we have not established that the duopoly cannot improve on the
profits garnered by price leadership. Indeed, we now show that, under full
information, the equilibrium achieved by our scheme is dominated (from the
17
point of view of the duopoly) by other pricing arrangements. In figure 1 we
show isoprofit lines for both firms in the space of P. and P„. These lines
are drawn for e=e>0. Therefore the tangency of an isoprofit line for firm 1
o
and the 45 line occurs at prices higher than the tangency of an isoprofit
o
line of firm 2 and the 45 line. In our model of price leadership firm 1
o
picks the point at which one of its isoprofit lines is tangent to the 45
line. It is immediately apparent from the figure that both firms can be made
better off if they both lower their prices with firm 2 lowering its price by
more than firm 1 lowers its own. Furthermore, from the point of tangency of
firm 1's isoprofit line with the 45 line a small reduction in both prices by
the same amount raises total profits. This occurs because there is only a
second order deleterious effect on firm 1's profits while the beneficial
effect on firm 2 is of first order.
To see whether the duopoly can in fact improve upon its performance
with price leadership there are three issues to consider. The first is
whether given a fixed rule that picks firm 2's price as a function of firm
1
's price, it is possible to induce firm 1 to choose a price other than the
one that maximizes its own profits given this rule. For instance, we know
that, even when firm 2 matches firm 1's price the total profits of the
duopoly can be increased from those that are achieved when firm 1 announces
prices given by (5). Yet, is it possible to induce firm 1 to announce a
price (say P') different from the one given by (5)? We now argue that this
is impossible unless a and e become common knowledge at some point.
On the other hand the tangency of an isoprofit line of firm 2 with the 45
line can be interpreted as the price picked by firm 1 as the leader when e is
equal to -e. There, the prices are too low. Both firms would benefit from
price increases with the follower increasing its price more than the
leader.
FIGURE 1: The Suboptimality of Price Leadership Under Full Information
Firm l's best response function
Outcome with Firm 1 as Price Leader
Firm 2's best-respon
Function
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If a and e do become common knowledge firm 2 can threaten to punish
firm 1 if it fails to announce P'. In other words, there exists an
equilibrium in which, as soon as a and e become common knowledge and it
becomes known P' was not picked, both firms revert to noncooperation because
each expects the other firm to revert to noncooperation.
Suppose that, instead, a and e never become common knowledge, i.e.
either firm 2 doesn't know them precisely or firm 1 doesn't know that firm 2
knows them or firm 2 doesn't know that firm 1 knows that it knows etc Then
what is to ensure that the punishment for deviations on the part of firm 1 is
actually meted out? One firm, say firm 2, must reveal that is now sure that
firm 1 has cheated in order for the noncooperative period to begin. Yet,
firm 2 can always pretend that it is unaware of firm 1 's deviations. By
doing so it ensures that no punishment will take place. This is better for
firm 2, even when firm 1 has announced the price given by (5), as long as
unilateral deviations by firm 2 from the price leadership equilibrium are not
profitable i.e. as long as Condition A is satisfied.
This analysis does not apply only to the case in which firm 2 must
match firm 1's price to avoid punishment. Instead, for any rule that picks
firm 2's price as a function of firm 1 's, we have shown that, unless a and e
become common knowledge, firm 1 must be allowed to pick the price it likes
best given the rule.
The second issue that arises, therefore, is whether it wouldn't be
better to let the follower pick a price different from the leader's. In our
analysis of figure 1 we showed that, when e is high, the follower should
undercut the leader while the opposite is true when e is low. In general we
Further implications of this analysis are sketched in the concluding
section.
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therefore cannot rule out the possibility that complicated rules that make
firm 2's price a (possibly) nonlinear function of firm 1 's make the duopoly
better off- Yet, even when fluctuations in a are ignored the first best
(with sidepayments) cannot be achieved by such rules. This can be seen as
follows. Maximum duopoly profits with zero marginal cost are achieved when
firm 1 charges a/2b+e/2(b+2d) while firm 2 charges a/2b-e/2(b+2d) . Thus if
firm 1 charges this maximizing price, firm 2 infers that e/2(b+2d) equals P.. -
a/2b and charges a/b-P.. . But then, firm 1 knowing this maximizes:
Pja+ e - bP
1
+d(a/b-2P
1
)],
which gives:
P
1
= ab/2b(b+2d) + e/2(b+2d).
This price is below that which maximizes duopoly profits. Since firm 2
infers a low value of e (which leads it to charge a high price) from a low
price by firm 1, there is an incentive for firm 1 to lower its price.
On the other hand variations in a unaccompanied by changes in e make it
optimal for both prices to move in tandem. Indeed if e is always zero, our
form of price leadership always brings about the first best allocation from
the duopoly's point of view. Thus it is only when fluctuations in e are
large relative to fluctuations in a that rules of the kind we are considering
here offer important benefits to the duopoly. Even then, price leadership
offers an advantage: the equilibrium behavior of the follower is related to
the leader's action in the simplest possible way. This both simplifies the
1 7This analysis neglects the fact that if firm 1 behaves in this manner
consistently firm 2 will ultimately learn this and punish firm 1 (see Radner
(1980) for an analysis along these lines). However, in the presence of even
moderate discounting and nonstationarities in the distribution of a, long-
term monitoring of this kind will be insufficient to keep firm 1 in
line.
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task of the follower and makes monitoring trivial. On the other hand, as
discussed in the introduction, the rules that improve upon price leadership
require a degree of sophistication, fine-tuning and implicit understanding on
the part of both firms, that strains plausibility. We therefore limit our
attention to price leadership.
The third issue which we want to consider is whether simultaneous
announcements can somehow improve upon price leadership. With simultaneous
announcements and firm 2 uninformed, firm 2's price must be state
independent. On the other hand, if we allow firm 1 to state
prices which are state dependent, it will always want to undercut the price
firm 2 will announce. Thus, firm 1 must also charge a state independent
price for the duopoly to achieve some measure of collusion.
The constant prices which maximize ex ante industry profits are natural
candidates for such a collusive outcome. They are on the profit frontier;
there are no other constant prices that make both firms better off ex ante .
Moreover, they treat both firms symmetrically.
The price that maximize both firms' ex ante profits is given by
[c/2 + a/2b] which is also the price that firm 2 would set if it were a price
leader. This price leads to expected profits of Lp for both firms. Thus
this scheme is strictly dominated by price leadership when R ? exceeds Lp.
Much more generally, it produces total profits which fall far short of those
produced by price leadership.
IV. PRICE STICKINESS AND PRICE LEADERSHIP
The problem, from firm 2's perspective, in allowing firm 1 to be the
leader, is that firm 1 takes advantage of this and thus picks a price that
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rises proportionately to e, the difference in the two demand curves. This
exploitation comes about not only when demands differ, but also when costs
differ, as when firm 1 faces a strike by its workers. One way of mitigating
this effect, particularly when the firms possess information of similar
quality, is to let the firms alternate the leadership role. 18 An alternative
way, and one that is more applicable when the firms' quality of information
differs substantially and when temporary fluctuations in e are important, is
to make prices relatively rigid. In other words, the leader is threatened
with reversion to noncooperation if he changes his price too often. We study
this role for rigid prices here.
If the leader must keep his price fixed for some time, it will make
its price a function of current and expected future e's. The longer the
period of price rigidity, the more important are the expected future e's
when firm 1 sets its price. Accordingly, if the expectation of future e's
is relatively insensitive to current demand conditions, the presence of
rigid prices dampens the effect of current e on price.
We illustrate this advantage of price rigidity with a simple example.
In particular, we assume that e., i.e. the value of e at time t, is given
by:
e
t
= Pe
t-1
+ E
t
(12)
where P is a number between zero and one while e, is an i.i.d. random
variable with zero mean. The intercept has two components; the first of
which is a, a constant, while the second, a , moves over time according to
the law of motion:
1 8Alternation of this kind has been observed in a variety of industries,
including steel and cigarettes.
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a
t " t-l
+ a
t ^
where $ is a number between zero and one while a is an i.i.d. random variable
with zero mean. Thus the intecept, a+a , tends to return to its normal value
as well. To accomodate the existence of inflation we write the demand curve
at t as:
Q
1t
=i+a
t
+6
t
"
bP
1t
/S
t
+ d(P
2t
"P
1t
)/S
t
Q 2t "
5 + a
t "
6
t "
bP2l/V d(P1t -P2t } /S t (14)
where S, is the price level at t. This price level is given by:
S
t
= X*. (\>1) (15)
The difference between X and one is the general rate of inflation. If
the price leader must set a price that will be in force for n periods
starting at time zero, it will pick a price that maximizes:
n
rt/ P x , - , P
E in I 6
X
( £_ -c) (a + a + e - b f- ) (16)1U
t=0 b t X t bt
= ! &\-4 - c) (V + a + pte n-t ^- )
t=0 \x X
X
where E.-. is the expectation conditional on information available at time
to firm one and 6 is the real discount rate. This price, P(n) is given by:
f0_ 1- (6«>A)
n+1 Jo_ 1-(6 P/X) n+1 +f _i_ c, 1-(6M)
n+1
p/\ 2b 1- 6<|)/\ 2b 1-6p/\ l 2b 2
J 1-6/\ (17)
(1- 6/X2 )
n+ 1
1- &/X2
Note that this price is increasing in n if there is inflation (X is greater
than one). It is also increasing in X and e.
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The expectation of the present discounted value of profits of the
follower (Wp(n)) is given by the expectation of the present value of profits
for the n periods during which the leader keeps his price fixed (n(n))
n +
1
divided "by (1-6 ). n(n) is given by:
Il(n) = Eq \ 6
t
(
PW
_ c)(
-
+ ^ _ ^ _ b P(n) } (18)
t-0 X X
where E~ takes unconditional expectations. The unconditional expectation of
both a~ and e~ is zero while their unconditional variance is var(a)/( 1 -<}>) and
var(e)/(l-P) respectively. This focus on unconditional expectations is
warranted if the follower is completely uncertain about the state of demand
I Q
at the moment he implicitly agrees to be a follower.
We can now write ¥„(n) as:
¥ (n) _ [i
+ c
2
b] 2 [l-6/X2 ][l-(6/X) n+1 ]
2
ac_
2 4b[l-6/X] 2 [l-(6/X2 ) n+1 [l-6n+1 ] 1
" 6
n+1i2
+ var(5)[l-6/^][l-(6VX) 1 ]
4b(l-*)[l-6*A] 2 [l-(6A2 ) n+1 ][l-6n1 ]
3var(e) [l -5/\2 ][l-( 6p/X) n+1 ] 2
4b(l-p)[l-6p/X] 2 [l-p/>,2 )
n+1 [l-6n+1 ]
To evaluate the benefits of price rigidity we consider two special
cases. In the first special case inflation is positive but the variance of a
is zero so that demand for the sum of the two products is deterministic
while in the second special case it is one (so that there is no inflation).
In both cases there is an incentive to prolong the duration of prices,
T?he analysis is essentially unchanged if the expectations used to evaluate
n(n) are conditional on somewhat more information as in section VII.
Of course, in a model in which the variance of a is literally zero, our
rationale for price leadership disappears. However, this example is only
intended to illustrate the effects of inflation on price rigidity.
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because this prolongation reduces the deleterious effect of var(e) on W„ . In
both cases there is also a cost to long price durations. In the first case
this cost is the erosion in prices caused by inflation while in the second it
is the insufficient response to changes in a. We analyze these special cases
as follows. First, we give the conditions under which the follower would
prefer some price rigidity, i.e. under which Wo(2) > ¥2(1). Then we study
the numerical properties of W~(n) for certain parameters.
Consider first the case in which inflation is zero- Assume also that
var(a)/[(l-<}>)(l-6<i>) 2 ], which we denote a , equals 3var( e)/[ ( 1 -p) ( 1 -6p) 2 ] ,
9.
which we denote a . Recall that this is the condition under which firm 2 is
e
just indifferent between being a follower and a leader. Then, the follower
prefers prices to be constant for two periods if:
[ 1-(&4>)
2
]
2
- [ 1-(&P)
2
]
2
> [l-6<j,] 2
-[1-6(3]^ (19)
1-62 1-62 1-6 1-6
As shown in the appendix this inequality is satisfied as long as (3 is
less than <£• Thus as long as the decay towards zero of the difference in
demands is more rapid than the decay of the absolute level of demand towards
its normal value, the follower prefers the leader to maintain some price
rigidity. The intuition for this is that since a rapid decay of e towards
zero means that the leader will be relatively inattentive to e when setting a
price for a relatively long horizon. On the other hand, if a decays slowly,
he will still make his price fairly responsive to the current value of a.
What we must show now is that the follower may prefer a finite period
of price rigidity to an infinite one. This is plausible since, if e decays
rapidly, the benefit from continued price rigidity, namely the loss in
responsiveness to e becomes unimportant as the horizon becomes longer. We
25
provide a numerical example in which the follower does indeed prefer a
finite period of price rigidity. 21 Figure 2 shows the value of W
?
(n) when
a equals a while k is .98, f3 is .6 and $ is .9- The follower's welfare is
a e
maximized when n is equal to five. If, instead, a is made to equal only
.8a then the maximum occurs at n = 7- Clearly, an increase in the variance
of the difference in demands warrants a longer period of price
rigidity to reduce further the effect of e on price.
Now consider the special case in which the var(a) is zero. Assume
further that, a is equal to [(c b+a)/( 1 -6/\) ] /4b which we denote a, « 22
This case reveals a slightly different advantage of price rigidity.
Price rigidity makes it impossible for the leader to fully respond in every
period to increases in e even if these are permanent. Even when f3 is one,
the follower benefits from this lack of responsiveness to e. This can be
seen by noting that, under the current assumptions, when P is one, W"2 is
independent of both n and the rate of inflation. In this case the loss in
the responsiveness to e just offsets the loss from responding to inflation
more generally. If, instead, (3 is less than one, it can be shown that the
follower always prefers some price rigidity. Indeed, it can be shown then
that ¥2(2)>¥ 2 (1 ). This requires that:
[l-(6/X) 2 ]
2
_
[1-6P/X] 2
>
(1-6/X) 2
_
(l-6B/\) 2
(2Q)
(l_62/\4 )(l-62 ) (i-6
2/\4 )(1-52 ) (i_6/\
2 )(1-6) (l-SA2 )(l-6)
which is proved in the appendix. Thus, if the variance of £ is sufficiently
This preference for finite periods of price rigidity is a feature of every
numerical example we have studied.
^This is probably unrealistic since it requires a very large variance of
e.
FIGURE 2: Profitability of Price Stickiness for the Follower
The Case of Stochastic Aggregate Demand
W
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big while e decays even slightly towards its mean, firm 2 prefers some
rigidity to complete flexibility. Once again, a decay of e over time
induces the leader to make its price unresponsive to e if it is to keep a
relatively rigid price. The follower benefits from this. We again consider
some numerical examples to show that the follower may prefer a finite period
of price rigidity. Figure 3 shows ¥2 (n) for 6 of .98, P of .7, X of 1.02 and
a equal to one fourth of c\. The maximum is given by n=18. Reductions in
inflation that make X. equal to 1.01 raise the optimal n, from the follower's
perspective, to 25. Increases in a also tend to raise this optimal n.
While we have rationalized price rigidity by arguing that it leads to
a more equitable distribution of the profits from implicit collusion one must
be careful in drawing the implications of this analysis for macroeconomics.
In particular, we have only shown that the follower wants to reduce the
ability of the leader to respond to temporary shifts in relative demand (or
cost). Thus, for instance, the follower does not want the leader to be able
to take advantage of temporary consessions by the leader's suppliers. This
argues for limits on the ability of the leader to change prices at will.
However, it does not argue for complete nominal rigidity. Rather it argues
for rules that make prices respond to aggregate shocks in a mechanical rather
than a discretionary way at least for some time. It argues for some forms of
indexation. It is only if such indexation is infeasible (because, for
example, the antitrust authorities might become suspicious at such
preannounced indexation or because customers prefer to be quoted a price
rather than a price rule) that fixed nominal prices become the preferred
solution to the oligopoly's problem.
FIGURE 3: Profitability of Price Stickiness for the Follower - The Case of Inflation
W
2
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2
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V. The Tendency for Ncmcooperative Prices to Differ
We have shown that when implicitly colluding oligopolists operate in the
presence of asymmetric information, they may find a form of price leadership
to be an effective strategy for both price-setting and profit-sharing. We
now turn our attention to the converse: should price leadership be
considered to be evidence of implicit collusion? We argue below that if the
oligopolists are selling differentiated products, the answer is "yes". We
already saw in section II that if firms act noncooperatively and announce
their prices simultaneously, their prices tend to differ. This occurs unless
they are perfectly symmetric in the full information case or their
information is very perculiar in the asymmetric information case. However,
simultaneous price announcements cannot possibly capture the dynamics of
price leadership. In this section we explore the possibility of
noncooperative price leadership by letting firms announce their prices
sequentially . This seems to be what is popularly referred to as "barometric"
price leadership. We show that sequential price announcements, if anything,
make it less plausible that the firms will charge the same price. Even if
the firms are symmetric the follower tends to undercut the leader's price.
We show that prices tend to differ not only when there is symmetric
information, but also when there is asymmetric information of the kind
modeled in Section II.
(a) Symmetric Information
Suppose that demand is as in (1 ) and that both a and e are common
knowledge. Let firm 1 announce P., first and firm 2 announce V^ after
learning P. . This is the analog in this setting of the Stackelberg model.
Given a price, P., of firm 1, firm 2 maximizes (P9 - c)(a-e-bP + d(P,- P~))
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Its optimal P2 is therefore (a- e+(b+d)c+dP 1 )/2(b+d) . Knowing this, firm 1
maximizes:
(P
1
-c)(a+e-(b+d)P
1
+d[(a-e-(b+d)c+dP
1
)/2(b+d)]. (21 )
Thus firm 1 charges
P = [a(2b+3d)+e(2b+d) + c( 2b+d) (b+2d) ]/2(2(b+d) 2-d 2 )
.
(22)
Therefore the difference in the equilibrium prices of the two firms is:
P _ P =
[ad2 +e(8b2 +3d 2-H2bd) - cbd 2 ]
_ (2?)
1 2 4(b+d)(2b +d 2+2bd)
If e=0, P-i-Pp > provided a > be which is a necessary condition for
outputs to be positive. Thus whenever the firm's positions are "symmetric",
firm 2 undercuts firm 1's price. If e is positive so that firm 2's demand is
weaker than firm 1's, firm 2 has an added incentive to lower its price and
Po is again below P.. . If, on the other hand, e is negative then firm 2's
demand is stronger than firm 1's. Although firm 2 still exploits its
followership position and "undercuts" firm 1 's price, since Pp is decreasing
in e (and P. is increasing in e) as e decreases the two equilibrium prices
achieve equality momentarily and then P„ becomes larger than P. . Although in
general either firm's price can be the higher one, it would be sheer
coincidence for them to be exactly equal,
(b) Asymmetric Information
The argument for differing equilibrium prices in the previous subsection
may not be convincing in the presence of asymmetric information, which is
after all the basis of our price leadership model. Suppose, for example,
that firm 1 has superior information about demand. Suppose further that e=0
so that the firms face symmetric demands. If the firm's are behaving
noncooperatively, might firm 2 not believe that firm 1 is setting the
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industry noncooperative price and, in the absence of any precise demand
information of its own, simply choose to match firm 1 's price? This cannot
constitute equilibrium behavior, however. If firm 1 believed that it was
going to be matched in this simple way it would have an incentive to raise
its price to the monopoly level. Knowing that, however, firm 2 would have an
incentive to undercut firm 1's price. Thus, there is no simple equilibrium
matching strategy.
In what follows we analyze the equilibrium of this noncooperative game
in which the firms are asymmetrically informed and which firm 1 's price may
signal some (or all) of its information to firm 2. As in the previous
subsection we find that firm 2's equilibrium price is generally lower than
that of firm 1
.
We suppose that demand is as in (1) and consider the symmetric case,
e=0. For simplicity we assume that c=0 and that a e[0, m J. We analyze the
separating, pooling and partially pooling equilibria in turn.
(i) Separating Equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium firm 2 is able to infer a exactly from P.. .
Thus firm 2 believes that there is a one-to-one relationship between a and P..
which we denote by a(P, ). After observing P., firm 2 maximizes
P
2
(a(P
1
) - (b+d)P 2 + dP.,) which requires setting P 2 = [a^) + dP., ) ]/2(b+d)
.
Knowing this, firm 1 maximizes
P
1
(a-(b+d)P
1
+d[a(P
1
)+dP
1
]/2(b+d) (24)
which gives the f.o.c:
2a(b+d)/d - (4(b+d) 2 -2d 2 )P
1
/d + a(P
1
) + P a'CP^-O. (25)
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But in equilibrium firm 2's beliefs must be correct so that a=a(P,).
Substituting this in (25) gives
Xa^) + pP
1
+ P^'CP^ = (26)
where \=(2b+3d)/d and 8H-(4(b+d) 2 -2d 2 )/d. Equation (26) is a first-order
ordinary differential equation with solution
SP^* 1 * aU+OP^ k = 0. (27)
Consider the case where a=0. Clearly, P.. cannot be negative for this case-
Suppose then that P., is positive. In equilibrium firm 2 is able to infer
that a=0 and charges its best-response, namely 7 = dP./2(b+d) < P.. But
then Q = -(b+d)P + d 2 P /2(b+d) < 0. Therefore, in this case P must be
zero, which from (27) implies that k=0 since B£0. Thus (26) has the unique
solution 8P.| + a(\+l)=0 or, rewriting,
=
a(b+ 2d)
m (28)
1 2(b+d) 2 -d 2
2 2
Thus firm 2's equilibrium beliefs are given by a(P..) = P (2(b+d) -d )/(b+2d).
Since ?
2
=
[ a ( p i) +dP i ]/2(b+d) , we have
P . a ^ 2^) - . (29)
2 2(2(b+d) 2 -d 2 )
If dffi and a^ then P„ < P. . In equilibrium firm 2 infers the actual value
of a from firm 1's price and then undercuts that price.
In the symmetric information case of the previous subsection, we had P..
= a(2b+3d)/2(2(b+d) -d ) for the case in which e=c=0. Thus with asymmetric
information if aW then the equilibrium price is strictly higher than with
symmetric information. This is the familiar "overinvestment" characteristic
of signaling models. Firm 1 has an incentive to convince firm 2 that a is
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high since Pp is increasing in a. Since a(P^ ) is increasing in P.. in
equlibrium, this leads firm 1 to charge a higher price than it otherwise
would. Firm 1 is worse off, and firm 2 better off, in the separating
equilibrium than with complete information.
Note that as the products become increasingly good substitutes (d-**°) the
prices tend to zero, the competitive price, both when information is
symmetric and when it isn't. Similarly, if d=0, they charge the monopoly
price a/2b in both cases. However, unless the products are perfect
substitutes or completely independent in demand, the prices charged by the
two firms differ if the firms behave noncooperatively. This occurs even if
firm 1's price is acting as a "barometer" of industry demand.
(ii) Pooling Equilibrium
In a pooling equilibrium, firm 1 sets the same price, say P
, regardless
of the true value of a. Firm 2 maximizes P (a - (b+d)P + dP ) , which
implies P„= (a + (b+d)P.. )/2(b+d) . Here the firms charge equal prices if
(and only if) P
2
= P. = (a+dP^ )/2b+d) , or ?. = a/(2b+d).
Thus there may exist a pooling equilibrium in which the firms charge the
same price. Furthermore, this price would be unresponsive to fluctuations in
demand. However, we show below, that within the class of pooling equilibria,
both firms would prefer one in which P is higher: Consider firm 1's profits
when it charges P.
:
n* (P ) = P (a-(b+d)P + d(a + dP )/2(b+d).
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an'
i .
-.2
dP^ P
1
= a/(2b+d)
= IdV2(b+d)(2b+d) > 0.
Thus firm 1 prefers a higher pooled price. Since firm 2's profits are
increasing in P., it too prefers a higher price. Thus the pooling
equilibrium with a common price is Pareto dominated by another pooling
equilibrium. But, in the equilibria in which P. is higher than a/(2b+d),
firm 2's price is lower than firm 1's. Thus even in the case of pooling
equilibria, equal prices are unlikely.
(iii) Partial-Pooling Equilibria
There may also exist equilibria that are hybrids of the separating and
pooling equilibria. In equilibria of this kind firm 1 partitions a into a
finite number of intervals and charges the same price for all a's within an
interval, but different prices for a's from different intervals. Thus there
is pooling within intervals but separation across intervals. It is easy to
see that in general the firms' prices will differ in partial-pooling
equilibria as well. This is because the analysis for each interval is the
same as that for the pooling equilibria above. An equilibrium in which the
firms have identical prices in some interval will be Pareto dominated by one
that has higher and unequal prices in that interval.
VI WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF PRICE LEADERSHIP
In the light of the previous section we should view price leadership as
a collusive device. Thus it is natural to examine how the perfomance of
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price leadership compares with that of overt collusion. We already know,
from section III, that the former has lower aggregate profits. Here we study
consumer welfare and the aggregate of consumer and producer surplus.
In principle the analysis of consumer welfare should be carried out
using the preferences of consumers whose aggregate demands are given hy (1).
In practice this is very difficult, in part because different individuals
will be affected differently thus mandating interpersonal comparisons of
utility, and in part because modelling the individual consumers whose demands
aggregate to (1) is nontrivial. Therefore we compare instead the expected
consumer surplus under the two regimes.
This is done as follows. For each value of e we consider the excess
willingness to pay for good i above the price paid by consumers. Consumer
surplus in the market for good i is the sum across consumers who buy good i
of this excess willingness to pay. It is simply the area under firm i's
demand curve. We then add the consumer surplus for both goods to obtain the
industry's level of consumer surplus. We then compute the expected value of
consumer surplus across variations in e for each regime . Finally we
compare these two values.
To simplify this welfare comparison we let c equal zero and we ignore
fluctuations in the sum of the demands of the two firms so that a is
This gives, ignoring income effects, results identical to those using the
procedure of Diamond and McFadden (1974).
T'his might be viewed as somewhat problematic if the different regimes
provide different degrees of insurance against fluctuations in e. Yet, it
measures accurately, (ignoring income effects) the expected disbursements of
a social planner who wishes to make consumers equally well off under both
regimes. These expected disbursements are relevant if the planner is risk
neutral with respect to fluctuations in e.
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constant. 25 Initially we also assume that e takes only two values with equal
probability: a high one, e and a low one, -e . Since our results depend only
on e , they are valid for any symmetric distribution of e.
Under price leadership the price charged by both firms when e is high
is (a+e)/2b. This leads firm 1 to sell (a+e)/2 and firm 2 to sell
(a-3e)/2. On the other hand when e is low, the price is (a-e)/2b, the output
of firm 1 is (a-e)/2 and the output of firm 2 is (a+3e)/2. The level of
consumer surplus in the market for good 1 when e is high is half the productt
of the output of firm 1 and the difference between the intercept of the
inverse demand curve of good 1, [a/b+e/(b+2d) J , and the price. An analogous
computation gives the level of consumer surplus in the other cases.
This gives a level of consumer surplus under price leadership of:
a
2 /2b + i 2 (5b+2d)/2b(b+2d). (30)
With joint profit maximization the price (a/2b + e/2(b+2d)), and output
(a/2 + e(b+4d)/2(b+2d) ) , of firm 1 when e is high are respectively equal to
the price and output of firm 2 when e is low. Also, the price (a/2b-
e/2(b+2d)) and output (a/2 -e(b+4d)/2(b+2d) ) of firm 1 when e is low are
respectively equal to the price and output of firm 2 when e is high. Thus
total consumer surplus is given by twice the consumer surplus from either
good. This equals:
a
2 /2b + e 2 (b+4d)/2(b+2d) 2 . (31)
2 ?fiThus the difference in consumer surplus depends only on e . Indeed the
difference between (30) and (31) is given by 2(b+d) 2e 2/[ (b+2d)
2b] which is
clearly positive so that consumers prefer price leadership. From the point
^
As discussed in the following footnote below, this latter simplification
has no material effects on our results.
^he lack of dependence on a demonstrates that this comparison is
independent of the distribution of a.
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of view of consumers, price leadership has the disadvantage that, when e is
high, both prices are high so that there is little surplus either in the
market for the preferred good (good 1) or the other good. On the other hand
when e is low, both prices are low. This gives a very large surplus
particularly because the price for the preferred good (good 2) is much lower
than under joint profit maximization. This second effect dominates the first
because as prices are higher, the loss in consumer surplus from an additional
price increase are smaller simply because there are fewer consumers in the
market.
On the other hand, the gain in consumer surplus from price leadership
over joint profit maximization is less than the loss in profits from the
former arrangement. This is not surprising since price leadership is quite
inefficient for the duopoly when e is nonzero. Thus price leadership is a
less efficient arrangement from the point of view of the risk neutral
planner. This can be seen by computing expected profits under both
arrangements.
With joint profit maximization, expected profits are just twice
consumer surplus or:
a
2 /b + e2 /(b+4d)/(b+2d) 2 .
2 —2
With price leadership the leader earns (a + e )/2b while the follower
2 —2
earns (a -3e )/2b. So profits under joint profit maximization exceed
leadership profits by:
e
2 [(b+4d)/(b+2d) 2 + 1/b] = e2 2(b2 + 2d 2+4bd)/[(b+2d) 2b]
which exceeds the gain to consumers by 2e d(2b+d)/[ (b+2d) bj.
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VII ENDOGENOUS LEADERSHIP WHEN BOTH FIRMS RECEIVE SIGNALS
Up to this point we have treated firm 1 as fully informed about the
current state of demand while firm 2 was completely uninformed. This is much
too restrictive and stacks the deck in favor of firm 1 emerging as the
leader. Also, it means that it is relatively straightforward for firm 2 to
infer the information available to firm 1 from observations of output and
price. Thus it is much easier for deviations of firm 1 from an arbitrary
pricing path to become common knowledge than is intuitively plausible. In
this section we remedy these deficiencies by letting both firms receive
signals a- and e. which are unbiased indicators of a and e. In particular we
assume that:
a. = a + a.
e. = e + e.
where the a's and e are forecast errors uncorrelated with information
available to each individual firm. Thus if firm i can be sure that firm j
will follow its price, it sets a price equal to P.:
P. = c/2 + [a. -(-I) i e.] /2b.
l l l
We now consider the expected profit of firm 2 both when firm 1 is a
leader (Rp) and when firm 2 is a leader (L~). The former is given by:
R2
= E[(a
1
+e
1
)/2b - c/2][a - e - (a,,+ e
1
)/2 -bc/2]
= E[(a - be) 2 -
^
2
- 3e 2 - e 2/- 4ee ]/4b.
The latter is given by:
L
2
= E[(a
2 -e 2 )/2b - c/2][a - e - (a 2~e 2 )/2 -bc/2]
= E[(a - be) 2 - a
2
2
+ e
2
- e
2
2 ]/4b.
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Thus, firm 2 prefers to let firm 1 be the leader if:
E[(a
2
2
-*f) + (£2
2
- z
2
) -A{e 2 + e'El )]
is positive.
The three terms inside the square brackets are easily interpretable.
The first term is positive as long as firm 1 makes smaller forecast errors
when forecasting a while the second term is positive when firm 1 makes
smaller forecasting errors as it forecasts e. Such higher precision on the
part of firm 1 makes it a natural leader. On the other hand, if e varies a
lot then leaving the leadership to firm 1 hurts firm 2 since the leader
exploits the movements of e to its opponent's disadvantage. Finally, the
more correlated is firm 1 's signal of e with e itself, the worse the
outcome for firm 2 since firm 1 will charge a high price precisely when
firm 2's demand is low. Note that if we view firm 1 as updating from its
prior mean of zero every time it observes a variable related to e we expect
a high value for e to be generally associated with a negative value of z. .
In other words we expect Eee> to be negative. In the extreme case in which
2firm 1 always has the same signal for e, Ee z is equal to Ee and the last
term cancels. Here, firm 1 is uninformed about e so that it does not exploit
the differences in demand.
Now we can ask whether in this case, where the follower is much more
informed than before, we can improve from simple price leadership in a
straightforward way. Eor instance, can the follower succeed in making the
leader's price less sensitive to e- by threatening to revert to
noncooperation? Once again, these threats of reversions to noncooperation
are only credible if the reversions are triggered by variables which are
common knowledge. Otherwise firm 2, who does not prefer the punishment
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period ex post will prefer to pretend that it has not discovered the
deviation by firm 1
.
In a setup such as this, it is extremely unlikely that a. and e
1
ever
become common knowledge. While in section III knowledge of a and e was
sufficient to infer a. and e. because firm 1 was known to be perfectly
informed, this knowledge is insufficient when firm 1 receives noisy signals.
However, suppose a and e ultimately become common knowledge. Then firm
2 can threaten to revert to competition if the price firm 1 posts proves
ex post to be out of line with a desirable price P'(a,e). Such a price
might for example be the common price that maximizes industry profits (c/2 +
a/2(b-d)). However, in this case reversions to competition will also be
9 7triggered by simple mistakes on the part of firm 1. If firm 1 thinks
incorrectly that demand is high while e also happens to be high, then the
high price it announces must eventually lead firm two to punish it. Thus, in
situations in which the ex post outcome conveys relatively poor information
about firm 1's ex ante knowledge, we would not expect the follower to punish
the leader for picking prices which are too responsive to changes in e.
VIII. PRICE LEADERSHIP IN THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Our theory has three implications for the attempt by American Airlines
to establish price leadership in the U.S. airline market: we would expect
American Airlines to be relatively well-informed; for the announcement and
adoption of the plan to have been profitable for all the airlines; and for
American Airlines to have had a disproportionately large increase in
2 7Such mistakes are analogous to those that trigger price wars in Green and
Porter (1983).
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profits. We provide evidence in support of each of these implications in
turn below.
First, in terms of information, the larger carriers are presumably also
the better informed about demand conditions since they observe passenger
bookings on more routes and at different times. It is thus reassuring for
the theory that the airline to emerge as price leader is one of the two
largest, second only to United Airlines. More importantly, however, is the
access of some of the airlines to information generated by their computer
reservation systems (CRS's). In 1983, bookings made on CRSs accounted for
88$ of the domestic revenues of travel agencies. In 1983 there were six
CRS's, were able to produce reports of bookings by carrier and by segment,
including American's SABRE system and United 's Apollo system. Significantly,
from our point of view, the SABRE system had a 49$ market share of the
domestic revenues generated by travel agencies using these systems. United 's
Apollo system, by contrast, had a market share of only 31$- These systems
Furthermore as the Department of Justice reports "the marketing people had
access to to that information" and "it was used for planning purposes
..". Moreover, at the time American and United shared only a fraction of
this information with other airlines, and then only with some delay.
"Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking - Airline Computer Reservation
Systems", Comments and Proposed Rules of the Department of Justice before the
CAB, Docket 41686, September 9, 1983-
"1985 Report of the Department of Justice to Congress on the Airline
Computer Reservation System", U.S. Department of Justice, December 20, 1985,
Appendix.
^J.S. Department of Justice, 1983, ibid., p .155-
31ibid. pp. 156/7.
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Therefore American may have had the best demand information at the time that
the new fare structure was proposed; at any rate, it seems implausible that
any airline had significantly superior information.
Second, we study whether the announcement and acceptance of the
American plan was profitable for the airlines. We do this by computing the
change in the market value of the airlines' equity. Under assumptions
standard in the field of Finance, this change in market value represents the
change in the expected present discounted value of the stream of
•DO O O
profits. ' We ask whether the returns to the equities of the airlines
were unusually high following the announcement. This can be tested if one
has an estimate of the variability of the risk-adjusted returns on the
airlines' equity.
To obtain such an estimate, we start by fitting the simple capital
asset pricing model (CAPM) to the 200 trading days before March 14 and to 200
trading days starting with the day 56 trading days after March 14. This
gives us estimates of the a's and the (3's of each of the airlines as well as
of the portfolio which consists of an equal number of dollars invested in
each airline. Using these estimates we can compute the excess returns (the
32See Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) and Ruback (1982) for examples of
our methodology. Rose (1985) applies this method to the analysis of other
aspects of industry structure.
3 "3To the extent that investors were uncertain that the American plan would
succeed, the change in market value under estimates the value of successful
price leadership. The change in market value thus provides a lower bound on
this value.
^)he data for this analysis are collected by the Center for Research in
Security Prices of the University of Chicago.
3 5Our results do not depend on whether we use the estimates obtained from
only the trading days after the event or those obta ined using both
subsamples. We report results based on the latter procedure.
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returns not explained by the a's or by the movements in the stock market as a
whole. ) during the days following March 14- An estimate of the variance of
these excess returns is computed using the 50 trading days starting on March
22, by which time the effect of the airlines' announcements was presumably
incorporated in the stock prices. The first two columns of Table 1 present
the excess returns for the periods March 14-17 and March 1 5—1 T
-
3 8
Since we are interested in knowing whether these returns are unusual
for the industry as a whole, we first abstract from the idiosyncratic risk of
each airline. To do this we study the excess returns on an equally weighted
portfolio of all fourteen airlines. This return is significantly positive at
the \% level when considering the three day return and at the 5% level when
considering the four day return. Moreover, and perhaps more strikingly, the
excess returns of each individual airline were positive in this period, some
significantly so.
Finally, we examine the absolute change in the value of the airlines'
equity. The last column in the table gives the change in market value
implied by the excess returns. As can be seen, American's increase in value
is the largest ($109-2m), exceeding even that of the largest carrier, United
($91«5m). Also, the total change in market value (which understates the
gains to all airlines both because untraded carriers are excluded and because
36The market as a whole refers to the NYSE and the AMEX.
Our estimate of the variance is based on the assumption that the true
variance is constant. We also allowed the variances to change in an
autocorrelated manner as in Scholes and Williams (1977) without materially
affecting the results.
^Che returns are based on closing quotations. Thus a 0.12 return from March
15 to March 17 means that $1.00 in vested at the close of March 14 yielded
$1.12 at the close of March 17- We focus on returns starting both on March
14 and on March 15 because we do not know whether the American Airlines
announcement took place before or after the stock markets closed.
TABLE 1
Airline
American Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Eastern Air Lines
Northwest Air Lines
Ozark Holdings
PSA
Pan Am
Piedmont Aviation
Republic Airlines
Texas Air
Trans World Airways
United Air Lines
US Air
Western Air Lines
Equally weighted portfolio
Total
t-statistics in parenthesis
*In thousands of dollars
AND INCREASED MARKET VALUE
3/15-3/17 3/U-3/17 3/15-3/17
return return increase in
value *
0.12 0.11 109,212
(2.65) [2.10)
0.04 0.04 83,050
(1.29) [0.91)
0.04 0.04 8,240
(0.63) [0.61)
0.06 0.05 60,533
(2.00) [1-54)
0.05 0.03 8,955
(1 -78) [1 .00)
0.06 0.06 6,941
(1-59) [1-38)
0.05 0.08 4,884
(0.97) [1.28)
0.02 0.01 6,705
(0.77) [0.53)
0.16 0.13 30,820
(3-82) [2.80)
0.04 0.02 4,593
(0.66) [0.26)
0.09 0.10 44,617
(2.78) [2.63)
0.09 0.08 91,576
(2.78) [2.23)
0.04 0.05 29,589
(1 -02) [1.16)
0.04 0.01 3,748
(0.72) [0.11 )
0.06 0.05
(3.14) [2.07)
493,463
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preferred shares are ignored) is almost $0.5b suggesting that price
leadership is a quite effective collusive device.
These facts appear to he consistent with all three of the implications
of our theory. Yet it is important to be cautious in interpreting this
historical episode as a transition from disorganization to price leadership.
In some sense this was just a fare change, like many others. Indeed many
regular coach fares actually fell. However, a major feature of the American
proposal was to eliminate discounting from coach fares, except in narrow
special circumstances. American's stated goal was to lower the number of
passengers traveling on discount fares from 85% to 50$. This feature of
increased discipline in the industry, supported by the threat to match lower
prices, is one of the hallmarks of the industrial statesmanship that
characterizes price leadership. Similarly, it is American's insistence that
the change in fare structure be an industry-wide one, that strongly suggests
it viewed itself as a price leader.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper is concerned with explaining the behavior of firms in
industries in which price setting is accomplished through the announcements
of a price leader. The model we have developed gives an explanation for
the presence of price rigidity, provides an argument for exact price
matching even in differentiated products markets, and is capable of
determining endogenously which firm will be the price leader. It is thus
capable of explaining the pattern of pricing in a wide variety of
industries.
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"Prospects for New Air Fares", New York Times, March 30, 1983.
k0New York Times, March 15, ibid.
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While the price leadership scheme has many advantages from the point of
view of the duopoly, it does not usually implement outcomes on the duopoly's
profit frontier. In the paper we argued that this is due in part to the
inability of the follower to punish the leader (in a subgame perfect
equilibrium) in the absence of common knowledge about whether the leader
has charged the appropriate price given its private information. This
point has ramifications, which we are currently investigating, that extend
beyond this paper to many settings in which cooperative behavior is
sustained through the threat of later punishments.
By enriching the model in one of two ways the role for credible
punishments can be restored. First, even absent ex post common knowledge
about the leader's private information, there may be relevant indexes of
demand conditions that become available ex post and that are common
knowledge. For example, trade associations and the press publish estimates
of industry output. There is no reason why punishment strategies should not
be made conditional on these. Then, the duopoly may be able to do better
than under simple price leadership by implementing a scheme of the type
proposed by Green and Porter (1983). There, if the index of demand
conditions suggests that the leader has deviated from the collusive scheme
(i.e. that it is unlikely that its private signal is consistent with the
price it in fact charged) a price war ensues. Since, in general, the leader
will have only an imperfect signal of demand and the index is also an
imperfect measure of demand, in equilibrium price wars will sometimes be
triggered by mistake. Even though this will result in some losses to the
duopoly, it is nonetheless conceivable that the duopoly would be better off
with such a scheme than with price leadership.
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Second, one can envisage a reputations model a la Kreps et al. (1983)
that would restore a role for punishments. Suppose that there is no common
knowledge index of demand conditions, but rather that the leader believes
that there is (very small but) positive probability that the follower is
"irrational". Here irrationality implies that if the follower believes with
high probability that the leader has cheated it will revert to
noncooperation. Although the development of a model of this type is beyond
the scope of this paper, we conjecture that in such a setting credible
punishments would play a role. Not only would the follower be willing to
mete out the punishment if it is truly "irrational", but even a rational
follower may be willing to masquerade as its irrational counterpart so as not
to reveal its rationality, thereby keeping open the possibility of enjoying
cooperative behavior again in the future.
Let us turn now to the policy implications of our analysis. We have
argued that it is highly unlikely that the pattern of pricing under
investigation could arise in a reasonable model in which the firms behave
noncooperatively . Furthermore, our welfare analysis shows that while
consumers prefer price leadership to overt collusion, overall welfare is
lower. This suggests that a much less sanguine view of this practice is
warranted than that which has traditionally been taken by the courts.
However, anyone who would render price leadership a criminal act must
be sensitive to the possibility that there is a benign explanation for the
existence of identical prices, even for somewhat differentiated products. In
particular, if one is to condemn a firm simply because its rivals choose to
charge the same price as it does, one must be fairly convinced that the price
matching is a collusive practice. Certainly, the mere fact that firms, even
with differentiated products, charge identical prices cannot be deemed (on
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the "basis of this paper alone) to be proof of collusion. Yet, differences in
prices among competitively provided differentiated products seem pervasive,
thus creating a presumption of collusion when the prices are the same.
Tempering this conclusion, however, is the observation that brokers in
geographically unrelated markets (who presumably face different demand
conditions) charge the same commission for their services. For example,
residential realtors in the U.S. charge a commission of six percent
regardless of the part of the country in which they operate. Absent an
explanation of this pricing behavior, per se condemnation of identical prices
for firms with differentiated products facing differing relative demands
seems premature.
Rather, we suggest an approach that asks whether the market is one in
which the exertion of monopoly power is feasible and, second, whether there
is evidence of a consistent pattern of price leadership. The first question
corresponds to the first tier of the two-tier approach for diagnosing
predatory pricing advocated by Klevorick and Joskow (1979)- It entails
examining profitability, the conditions of entry, and the number and size
distribution of firms. The second question asks whether the hallmarks of
price leadership are present: advance announcement of price changes, swift
matching of these prices by rivals and relatively inflexible prices. The
presence of significant product differentiation should be considered to be
strong supporting evidence.
The framing of an exact legal rule is beyond the scope of this paper.
Such a rule would, for example, have to contend with situations in which
prices always differ by one penny. While we do not provide such a
rule here, our analysis suggests that one is called for.
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Firms, and some practitioners, may consider this approach to he unduly
harsh. After all, should firms risk prosecution simply for doing what others
are doing? However, firms in differentiated products markets will seldom
have to worry about prosecution. Aggressive firms that vigorously compete
with their rivals for the business of their customers will typically find
that the workings of the noncooperative process alone will lead their prices
to differ from those of their competitiors.
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APPENDIX I: PROOF OF INEQUALITIES 19 AND 20
Since, 6, (3 and 4> are less than one inequality (19) can be written as
follows:
(6p) 2- (6<}>) 2 60 - 64.
1-62 TZT
~
where
X = (2 - &<K - 6P)P + &)
2-(6<j)) 2 - (60) 2
This is equivalent to:
g-fcti [6P+6* - X] > 0.1-6 L 1+6 J
So, if (3< <)> the inequality is satisfied as long as X is bigger than
( 6(3+6<t>)/( 1 + 5) which is obviously less than one. Yet X is bigger than one
since by subtracting the denominator of X from its numerator one obtains:
2 - 6$ - 60 + 26-62 <|>-62 - [2-( 6<t>)
2
-( 6p)
2
] =
6(1-4.) (1-6*) + 6(1-0) (1-60) >
This completes the proof.
To prove the inequality given by (20) we first note that, since 6 is
smaller than one while 1/\ and are at most equal to one, (20) can be
written as:
(6PA) 2-(W 2
> (60A- 6A)i'
1 + 6/X2
where:
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r= (2
- 6p/\ - 6/\)Q + 6)
2 - (6P/X) 2 - (6/\) 2
This is equivalent to:
(&P/X - 6/\) [ 6A
+
6P/
^ - X
1
] >
1 + 6/\^
So, if P is smaller than one the inequality is satisfied as long as X'
2
is bigger than ( 6/X.+ 6p/X)/( 1 +6/\ ). This latter expression is smaller than
one since by subtracting the denominator from the numerator one obtains
:
(6/\)(0-1) + 26/\ - [1-6 + 6 + 6A2 ]
= (6/\)(p-l) " (1-6) " 6(l-1/\) 2 .
Moreover X' is greater than one since, by subtracting its denominator
from its numerator one obtains:
(2-5p/\-6/\)(l + 5)- (2-(6B/\) 2-(6/\) 2 ) =
( 1 - B/ X) ( 6- 6
2 6/ X) + (l-1/\)(6-52/\) >
This completes the proof.
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